The burden of an ageing society as a public debt by Siekmann, Helmut
Institute for 
Monetary and 
 Financial 
     Stability
 
 
 
 
 
 
HELMUT SIEKMANN 
 
 
THE BURDEN OF AN AGEING SOCIETY AS A PUBLIC DEBT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 1 (2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROF. DR. HELMUT SIEKMANN 
 
INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
PROFESSUR FÜR GELD-, WÄHRUNGS- UND NOTENBANKRECHT 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
MERTONSTR. 17 
60325 FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
TELEFON: (069) 798 - 23664 
TELEFAX: (069) 798 - 23651 
E-MAIL:  GELD-UND-WAEHRUNG@JUR.UNI-FRANKFURT.DE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HELMUT SIEKMANN 
 
THE BURDEN OF AN AGEING SOCIETY AS A PUBLIC DEBT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 1 (2006)  
 
The Burden of an Ageing Society as a Public Debt 
 
Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann 
 
Stiftungsprofessur für Geld-, Währungs- und Notenbankrecht 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Demographic change in industrialized nations has been a matter of common interest 
for some time. The financial implications of an ageing society are also increasingly 
discussed, particularly with regard to pension systems. The impact of this 
development on public finances is, however, only gradually being realized and the 
constitutional framework of public finances in Germany and the European Union just 
falls short of ignoring it entirely. 
 
This paper is a preliminary assessment of the burden of an ageing society under the 
fiscal law, specifically in respect of prospective entitlements to the public pension 
system. The first part analyses the provisions of the German constitution on finances 
(Finanzverfassungsrecht) to identify what rules, if any, exist addressing such 
(potential) expenditures, which lie in the immediate or very distant future. The 
second part of the paper analyses the fiscal requirements under European Union law. 
In the third and final part a few comments on the proposed national pact on stability 
and the recent moves to amend the German Federal Constitution are presented. 
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A. THE BURDEN OF AN AGEING SOCIETY AS AN “IMPLICIT” PUBLIC DEBT 
Not long ago, the European Commission prepared a report that deals extensively 
with the impact of an ageing society on public expenditure.
1
 It attempts a detailed 
forecast of the payments for pensions, health care, long-term care, education and 
unemployment benefits up to the year 2050. The results are given in absolute 
numbers as well as percentages of gross national products, and are specified for each 
member state. These estimates require careful scrutiny, because the financial 
statements for the public sector, as prescribed by the fiscal law, capture the financial 
burden of these payments for future budgets only in a very rudimentary manner. 
 
Economic publications, on the other hand, have for some time discussed the question 
of payments projected into the future that may cause financial burdens for coming 
generations that are similar to payments of interest and principal on the public debt.
2
 
This is especially true for prospective entitlements under social security systems and 
entitlements under the pension system for public employees, when such entitlements 
are not covered by an underlying fund, i.e. financed according to a “pay-as-you-go”-
principle. Intergenerational balance sheets have been developed in order to examine 
 
1
  Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (Directorate-General For Economic 
and Financial Affairs – DG ECFIN), The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projection for 
the EU25 Member States on pensions, health care, long-term care, education and unemployment 
transfers (2004-2005), Special Report n
o 1/2006; to the consequences of the demographic 
development for the economy as a whole see Deutsche Bundesbank, Demographische 
Belastungen für Wachstum und Wohlstand in Deutschland, Monthly Bulletin, December 2004, 
p. 15 es seq. 
2
  Corsetti, Giancarlo and Roubini, Nouriel, European versus American Perspectives on Balanced-
Budget Rules, The American Economic Review, vol. 86 (1996), p. 408, 410 who consider as 
particularly important future liabilities from first, the growth of public pension (social-security) 
systems; second, those from the expected increase in health-care expenditures.   
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this question with greater precision.
3
 Notionally, these figures are captured by the 
terms “prospective” or “implicit” public debt.
4
  
 
With reference to Article 121 EC Treaty, the German Council of Economic Advisers 
has tried to examine the „sustainability“ of government budgets in Germany. 
According to the Council, this task cannot be performed without an “intertemporal 
budget equation”.
5
 Retirement benefits that are financed by current revenues are not 
reflected in the overtly stated, “explicit” public debt. The Council finds a pension 
system that is financed by current revenues to be “economically equivalent … to a 
specific time path of overt government debt”. Thus, the Council holds that it is also 
indispensable for a sustainability analysis to complete the “explicit” public debt by 
adding a “statement of the implicit public debt”.
6
 A sustainability gap exists 
subsequently if the present value of the projected “primary balances” is not sufficient 
to cover the sum of the “implicit” and the “explicit” net public debt.
7
  
 
As a result, the Council of Economic Advisers has found an “implicit” debt 
amounting to 270% of the gross domestic product for the base year 2002. This 
 
3
  This approach can be traced back to Auerbach, Alan J./Gokhale, Jagadesh/Kotlikoff, 
Laurence J., Generational Accounting: A Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy, Journal of 
Economic Perspective, vol. 8 (1994), pp. 73-94; for Germany see: Feist, Karen and 
Raffelhüschen, Bernd, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen von Generationenbilanzierung, 
Wirtschaftsdienst 2000, pp. 440-448; Bonin, Holger, Generational Accounting – Theory and 
Application, Berlin – Heidelberg – New York, 2001. 
4
  Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Jahresgutachten 
2003/2004 „Staatsfinanzen konsolidieren – Steuersystem reformieren“, 2003, p. 270 es seq.; 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Defizitbegrenzende Haushaltsregeln und nationaler Stabilitätspakt, 
Monthly Bulletin, April 2005, p. 23, 30; Blankart, Charles B., Öffentliche Finanzen in der 
Demokratie, 6th ed. 2006, p. 379. Corsetti/Roubini, supra note 2, use the term “unfunded future 
liabilities”. 
5
  Sachverständigenrat, supra note 4, p. 274 (text-no. 441). A formal description can be found at 
Blankart, supra note 4, p. 381, who calls it an „intertemporal budget constraint of the state“.  
6
  Sachverständigenrat, supra note 4, p. 271 (text-no. 440). The assessment of a pension system 
which is financed by current revenues (“pay-as-you-go”) as “forced loan” can already be found 
at Blankart, Charles B., Öffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie, 2nd ed. 1994, p. 351 es seq., 
but not yet in the 1st ed. 1991; consent. Siekmann, Helmut, in: Sachs (ed.), Grundgesetz, 3rd ed. 
2003, Art. 115 margin-no. 5. 
7
  Sachverständigenrat, supra note 4, p. 274 (text-no. 441); reconsidered Jahresgutachten 
2005/2006 „Die Chancen nutzen – Reformen mutig voranbringen“, p. 297 (text-no. 441). This 
follows almost exactly Auerbach/Gokhale/Kothlikoff supra note 3, p. 75.  
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greatly exceeds the “explicit” debt
8
 of 60.8% of the gross domestic product for that 
year.
9
 This approach shows a significantly greater need for consolidation. The 
Bundesbank estimates it at 3.5% of the gross domestic product.
10
 
 
 
B. THE REGULATION OF THE “IMPLICIT” PUBLIC DEBT BY THE FISCAL 
CONSTITUTION OF GERMANY 
The “implicit” public debt is debt that is not recorded in the book-keeping of the 
state.
11
 This is one of its decisive differences from the “explicit” public debt. 
Examined below are the provisions of German constitutional law that offer starting 
points for capturing the “implicit” public debt. 
 
I.  The Present Day Focus of the Constitutional Rules on Government 
Borrowing 
The relevant provisions of both the German federal constitution (the “Basic Law”, or 
Grundgesetz) and, to a great extent, the state constitutions reveal a differentiated 
approach to governmental borrowing: As a general rule, however, they permit the 
credit financing of government projects and services.
12
 The balancing requirement in 
Article 110, para. 1, clause 2 of the Basic Law has to be understood in a strictly 
formal way. Any revenue can be used to balance the budget including proceeds of 
borrowed funds.
13
 The attempts of legal scholars to expand or enrich it by adding 
 
8
  The explicit debt is the debt, recorded in the budgets. 
9
  Sachverständigenrat, supra note 4, p. 276 (text-no. 445). 
10
  Zeitler, Franz-Christoph, Was bleibt vom Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt?, 2005, p. 9 
(manuscript). 
11
 See  Feist/Raffelhüschen, supra note 3, p. 448. 
12
  BVerfGE 79, 311, 334; Höfling, Wolfram and Rixen, Stephan, in: Bonner Kommentar zum 
Grundgesetz, Art. 115 margin-no. 63. 
13
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 110 margin-no. 65; Art. 115 margin-no. 9; Heun, Werner, in: Dreier 
(ed.), Grundgesetz, 2000, Art. 110 margin-no. 25; Hillgruber, Christian, in: v. Mangoldt/Klein/ 
Starck (ed.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 5th ed. 2005, Art. 110 margin-no. 54: “exclusively 
formal meaning”; Heintzen, Markus, in: v. Münch/Kunig (ed.), 4th/5th ed. 2003, Art. 110 
margin-no. 27; Jarass, Hans D., in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik  
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substantive contents
14
 have failed. The norm does not contain a material “balanced 
budget clause”.
15
 Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain the existence of the 
elaborate rules for the borrowing of funds in Article 115, para. 1 of the Basic Law. 
However, it should be noted that credit financing is only permitted under specific 
conditions and within narrow limits.  
 
The conditions specified in the German constitutional law are principally confined to 
the ways and limits of borrowing for the next budget. In principle, future 
developments are not taken into consideration. Thus, not even actual borrowing – in 
contrast to planned borrowing – is accounted for.
16
 Accumulated debt or 
sustainability gaps have remained beyond the attention of German constitutional law. 
Some legal scholars even state explicitly that Article 115 of the Basic Law does not 
contain a limit for the accumulated debt of the federal government.
17
  
 
 
Deutschland, 8th ed. 2006, Art. 110 margin-no. 5; Kirchhof, Ferdinand, Der notwendige 
Ausstieg aus der Staatsverschuldung, DVBl. 2002, p. 1569, 1574; Gumboldt, Nico, Europäisches 
Gemeinschaftsrecht als nachhaltige Verschuldungsbremse?, DÖV 2005, p. 499; Gröpl, 
Christoph, Schwächen des Haushaltsrechts – Wege zu einer nachhaltigen Finanzwirtschaft, Die 
Verwaltung, vol. 39 (2006), p. 215, 219; with reservation Höfling, Wolfram, Staatsschuldenrecht, 
1993, p. 311. 
14
  Stern, Klaus, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. II, 1980, p. 1250: 
“Missbrauchsschranke”; Lappin, Roland, Kreditäre Finanzierung des Staates unter dem 
Grundgesetz, 1994, p. 103; crit. Kirchhof, supra note 13. 
15
  The introduction of such a clause at the federal level in the United States has failed several times; 
see Senate Joint Resolution 106, 104. Cong., 1 sess. 1995; U.S. Congress, House Committee on 
the Budget, The Balanced Budget Amendment, Hearings, 2 Vols., 102. Cong., 2 sess. 1992; 
comparatively evaluated by Corsetti/Roubini, supra note 2, pp. 408-413.  
16
  The majority of legal scholars agree on this see Heun, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-no. 23 with 
further references to the discussion; see also Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 27, which is 
critical of this; strictly against such an interpretation Gröpl, supra note 13, p. 223; Schemmel, 
Lothar, Staatsverschuldung und öffentliche Investitionen, Karl-Bräuer-Institut der Steuerzahler 
(ed.) (leaflet 99), 2006, p. 157 es seq. with numerous references. 
17
  Heintzen, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-no. 5, referencing Wendt, Rudolf, in: 
v. Mangoldt/Klein/Starck (ed.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 5th ed. 2005, Art. 115 margin-
no. 33 es seq., where this is not stated. However, the attitude ist beginning to change; see the 
attempts to limit (the accumulated) government debt by: Gumboldt, supra note 13, p. 505, and 
Gröpl, supra note 13, p. 226 es seq.; see also Halstenberg, Friedrich, Staatsverschuldung ohne 
Tilgungsplanung, DVBl. 2001, p. 1405, who sees, however, the necessity of amending the 
constitution (p. 1407). Kirchhof, supra note 13, p. 1575, already demands the accounting of the 
implicit debt arising from future claims against the social security system under the given 
consitutional rules. He fails, however, to give any legal argument for this proposition.  
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II.  Starting Points for Capturing Future Financial Development  
1. The Direct Application of Article 115 of the Basic Law 
Even if governments find – in accordance with the opinion of the majority of legal 
scholars – that the “implicit” public debt is outside the domain of Article 115, this 
provision merits further consideration. This norm is of central importance in German 
constitutional law for government credit. Its scope of application encompasses the 
“borrowing of funds” (1). It is further applicable “to the assumption of surety 
obligations, guarantees, or other commitments that may lead to expenditures in 
future fiscal years” (2). 
 
(1) The term “borrowing of funds” is understood as the raising of financial means 
which have to be paid back.
18
 By creating future claims or prospective entitlements in 
the sense of the “implicit” public debt, the government does not raise financial 
means.
19
 However, the transformation of claims against the state into financial claims 
or the avoidance of payments by granting instruments promising future payment 
(financial deeds) are also considered to be the “raising of financial means”.
20
 This 
aspect, however, does not lead to a different result, as the government does not 
transform anything into financial claims or financial deeds by creating prospective 
entitlements. In contrast to the overtly expressed “explicit” public debt, the elements 
of the “implicit” debt have not yet vested as actionable claims. They are founded on 
statutory rules which can be changed prior to the relevant payment date. Thus their 
exact amount can only be given subject to future statutory changes,
21
 and most 
importantly they cannot provide a cause of action prior to their maturity. 
 
 
18
  Höfling, supra note 13, p. 29; Höfling/Rixen, supra note 12, margin-no. 124; Siekmann, supra 
note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 20; Heun, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-no. 11; Hüsken, Christian 
Bernd and Mann, Suzanne, Der Staat als “Homo Oeconomicus”?, DÖV 2005, p. 143, 149. 
19
  Gröpl is critical of this result with regard to prospective entitlements for government employees 
but he provides no sound legal alternative, supra note 13, p. 237. 
20
  Heun, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-no. 11; against the inclusion of the sparing expenditures as 
a type of borrowing Höfling/Rixen, supra note 12, margin-no. 126. 
21
  Sachverständigenrat, supra note 4, p. 271 (text-no. 439 at the end).  
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However, the “implicit” public debt could be regarded as forced loans – not only 
from an economic but also from a legal point of view.
22
 The Federal Constitutional 
Court so far has expressly refrained from deciding whether Article 115, para. 1 of the 
Basic Law embraces the forced loans of the government.
23
 In any case, this has to be 
denied if the clause requires the acquisition of financial means “by contract on a 
market”. But there is another caveat: assuming that the prospective entitlements are 
to be considered as forced loans, the payments of the future beneficiaries into the 
social security system may amount to an unconstitutional “extra contribution” 
(Sonderabgabe).
24
 This would be true regardless of the decision on the applicability 
of Article 115, para. 1 of the Basic Law. With respect to the entitlements of public 
employees, such a claim would in any case be barred. In effect, a claim to a defined 
or definable amount of money is not thereby created. Such a claim, however, is an 
indispensable prerequisite for the existence of a (forced) loan also. 
 
(2) The last possibility for a direct application of Article 115, para. 1, clause 1 of the 
Basic Law would be the existence of a “commitment that may lead to expenditures in 
future fiscal years”. Such a commitment will only be found to exist if the government 
contractually assumes liability for the obligation of a third party.
25
 This is not the 
case with prospective entitlements created by law. 
 
 
22
  For the economic point of view see supra note 4. 
23
  BVerfGE 67, 256, 280; likewise Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 20; agreeing 
Höfling, supra note 13, p. 57; Höfling/Rixen, supra note 12, margin-no. 156, who do not count – 
somewhat inconsistently – the proceeds from forced loans as borrowing in the meaning of 
Art. 115 para. 1 clause 2, 1st alt. Basic Law; different Heun, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-
no. 11. 
24
  In this sense, BVerfGE 67, 256, 274, 278, for the “Investitionshilfeabgabe” which had to be 
judged in that case. The payment were also not qualified as (regular) taxes within the meaning of 
Art. 105 para. 2 Basic Law.  
25
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 21; consenting: VerfGH Berlin, judgement of 21 
March 2003, NVwZ-RR 2003, p. 537, 540.  
  8
2. The Indirect Consideration of “Implicit” Public Debt within the Framework of 
Article 115 Basic Law 
Article 115, para. 1, clause 1 of the Basic Law links the revenue obtained from 
borrowing to the total investment expenditures provided for in the budget. This rule 
speaks of global figures that have to correspond. The total amount of the planned net 
increase of debt must not exceed the total amount of the planned investment 
expenditure in the budget. 
 
This correlation of the two figures suggests that the regulation as a whole is future-
oriented, even though it expressly states requirements for only one – the next – fiscal 
period. It is based on the assumption that expenditures for investments result in the 
acquisition of durable goods. They are ideally ready for use in future periods (for 
“future generations”) to the same extent as the burden of the debt that finances them 
has to be borne. The Federal Constitutional Court also sees the “normative intent” of 
Article 115, para. 1, clause 2 of the Basic Law to limit government debt, and stresses 
the future benefits of budgetary expenditures for investments.
26
 However, the dictum 
of the Court was pronounced in a different context, it was directed at the lack of a 
specifying federal law under clause 3 of this provision,
27
 and no workable guideline 
for judging the sustainability of public debt in general can be derived from this.  
 
Another barrier has to be surmounted in so far as the “implicit” public debt is 
comprised of prospective entitlements to pensions to be paid by the social security 
system: Here paragraph 2 of Article 115 of the Basic Law is significant. It states that 
exceptions to the provisions of paragraph 1, Article 115 of the Basic Law may be 
authorized by federal statute with respect to special trusts of the Federation 
(Sondervermögen des Bundes). However, the German social security system is not 
comprised of such (semi-independent) special trusts, but rather of separate legal 
entities created by public law. Such legal persons fall under neither paragraph 1 nor 
 
26
  BVerfGE 79, 311, 334, 337; 99, 57, 67; see also Schwarz, Kyrill-A., Voraussetzungen und 
Grenzen staatlicher Kreditaufnahme, DÖV 1998, p. 721, 722 but ignoring completely the 
longstanding debate whether government debt is a burden on future generations. 
27
 Note  also  Gumboldt, supra note 13, p. 501.   
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paragraph 2 of Article 115 of the Basic Law. These entities have budgetary 
autonomy and are not part of the federal budget, even if they are financed by the 
Federation and/or the Federation is liable for their obligations.
28
 For this reason, it 
does not matter whether a liability of the Federation for the obligations of the social 
security system can be derived directly from Article 120, para. 1, clause 4 of the 
Basic Law,
29
 and thus an “implicit” debt of the federal government can be construed 
in respect of prospective entitlements to retirement benefits from the social security 
system.  
 
Moreover, some legal scholars contend that the borrowing by such legal persons 
have to be consolidated into the federal budget when there is an abuse of these 
formal legal structures
30
 or simply when they act on behalf or instruction of the state, 
even if they do it on their own account.
31
 Nevertheless, it is difficult to give a sound 
legal argument for such proposed consolidation; an additional difficulty arises from 
the elusive nature of the relevant facts.  
 
3. Orientation According to the “Overall Economic Equilibrium”  
The “overall economic equilibrium” is of significance in two provisions with respect 
to the borrowing of funds. First, according to Article 109, para. 2 of the Basic Law, 
the federation and the states have to take due account of the “requirements of the 
overall economic equilibrium” (Erfordernisse des gesamtwirtschaftlichen Gleich-
 
28
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 58; agreeing Heun, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-
no. 35; consenting VerfGH Berlin, judgement of 21 March 2003, NVwZ-RR 2003, p. 537, 538. 
29
  In this sense, BSGE 34, 148 (Headnote and p. 158); disagreeing Siekmann, supra note 6, 
Art. 120 margin-no. 28. Stefan Muckel finds that a close examination of the judgement reveals 
that the BSG also contradicts an application of Art. 120 para. 1 clause 4 Basic Law, and that it 
derives this finding from the “social state” principle (Sozialstaatsprinzip) of Art. 10 para. 1 Basic 
Law (in: v. Mangoldt/Klein/Starck (ed.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 5th ed. 2005, Art. 120 
margin-no. 40). In the present context the derivation of the result is irrelevant. 
30
  Hering, Achim, Die Kreditfinanzierung des Bundes über Nebenhaushalte, Diss. Bochum 1997, 
p. 294; Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 59 with further references; consenting: 
VerfGH Berlin, judgement of 21 March 2003, NVwZ-RR 2003, p. 537, 540; Heun, supra 
note 13, Art. 115 margin-no. 35; see also VerfGH Rheinl.-Pfalz, judgement of 20 November 
1996, DÖV 1997, p. 246. 
31
  Hüsken/Mann, supra note 18, p. 149 but without giving a solid legal justification.  
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gewichts) in managing their respective budgets. These requirements must also be met 
when borrowing funds. In this respect Article 109, para. 2 of the Basic Law and 
Article 115, para. 1 of the Basic Law have to be read together.
32
  
 
Second, Article 115, para. 1, clause 2of the Basic Law allows the borrowing of funds 
in excess of investment expenditures to avert a disturbance of the overall economic 
equilibrium. This is an exception to the regular borrowing limit (Regelkreditgrenze) 
applicable to the normal economic situation (Normallage). As an exception, it has to 
be construed narrowly and must be used only rarely, unlike the longstanding practice 
of both the Federation and the majority of the states.
33
 Furthermore, there is no 
legally permissable way to construe further exceptions to these borrowing limits.
34
 
 
The principle of orientation regarding the requirements of the “overall economic 
equilibrium” was clearly designed to counteract the phenomenon of cyclical 
economic fluctuations.
35
 Structural disequilibria are not embraced by any aspects of 
these norms.
36
 Nevertheless, the Federal Constitutional Court has interpreted 
Article 109, para. 2 of the Basic Law as being designed to limit the continuous 
accumulation of debt – by government borrowing well below the limit of 
Article 115, para. 1, clause 2, first part of the Basic Law – which could eventually 
jeopardize the ability of the budget to accommodate the demands of present or future 
 
32
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 26; consenting Wendt, supra note 17, margin-
no. 29. 
33
  See the compilation by the Sachverständigenrat, supra note 7, p. 312 (text-no. 477); Deutsche 
Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 30, even without considering depreciation and sale of capital assets 
whose counting would enlarge the – in economic terms – “true” deficit considerably; Schemmel, 
supra note 16, p. 286 es seq. (= attachments 2 and 3). 
34
  Therefore, the construction of an additional exception for a situation of “extreme budgetary 
distress” (extreme Haushaltsnotlage) by the Constitutional Court for the state of Berlin (decision 
of 31 October 2003, published in: NVwZ 2004, p. 210) is a clear breach of the Constitution; crit. 
also Rossi, Matthias, Verschuldung in extremer Haushaltsnotlage, DVBl. 2005, pp. 269-276. 
35
  Wendt, supra note 17, margin-no. 31; Hillgruber, supra note 13, Art. 109 margin-no. 52, 70; 
Gumboldt, supra note 13, p. 500. 
36
 Partially  disagreeing  Hillgruber, supra note 13, Art. 109 margin-no. 52 at the end, but without 
reference and inconsistent with his overall reasoning.  
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economic problems.
37
 The intention of the Court is certainly understandable, but its 
legal foundation is erroneous and, in the final analysis, it is an expression of 
helplessness in the face of political reality. The justification offered in scholarly 
circles – the excess burden from interest payments unduly limits the flexibility 
necessary to fight economic fluctuations –
38
 appears extremely contrived and does 
not deliver usable results in court.
39
 
 
4. The Proportionality Principle 
In a much noticed 2003 judgement, the Constitutional Court for the state of North-
Rhine-Westphalia declared unconstitutional and void sizeable parts of the budgets 
for 2001 and 2002.
40
 The plaintiffs claimed that a reserve fund had been created in 
those budgets to cover future expenditures, although the expenditures of the budget 
had been partially financed by borrowing. The Court did not find an infringement of 
the specific rules on the borrowing of funds or of other budgetary rules. However, in 
its opinion, the formation of such a reserve fund in a (partially) credit-financed 
budget was not compatible with the principle of cost-effectiveness as an expression 
of the general proportionality principle, which – supposedly – rules all government 
spending.  
 
It is doubtful in itself that the cost-effectiveness-principle also governs the decisions 
of the Parliament when acting on the budget.
41
 Its establishment in Article 114, 
para. 2 of the Basic Law speaks against it. Besides, a general rule that the proceeds 
from borrowing have to be spent in the same fiscal year can not – contrary to the 
opinion of the Court – be found in the provisions of constitutional law on 
government borrowing. That means that the specific rules on government borrowing 
 
37
  BVerfGE 79, 311, 255. 
38
  Höfling/Rixen, supra note 12, margin-no. 358 f.; agreeing: Wendt, supra note 17, margin-no. 34. 
39
  This is also acknowledged by Höfling/Rixen, supra note 12, margin-no. 360. 
40
  Judgement of 2 September 2003, NVwZ 2004, p. 217 es seq.; extensive comment by Wendt, 
Rudolf and Elicker, Michael, Staatskredit und Rücklagen, VerwArch, vol. 95 (2004), p. 471 es 
seq. 
41
  References to the discussion at Wendt, supra note 17, margin-no. 67c.  
  12
have to be applied exclusively. Recourse to general principles – as this Court has 
done – is not permissible.
42
  
 
Moreover, the Federal Constitutional Court explicitly stated in an earlier decision 
that the general proportionality principle is not an independent and separate barrier 
for government borrowing.
43
 The language of the Basic Law offers no support for 
construing a specific “fiscal proportionality principle”.
44
  
 
5. Democratic Principle 
Many attempts have been made to derive limits for public debt from the idea of a 
democratic form of government. The borrowing of funds ought to be considered a 
premature use of future revenues, which curtails the freedom of future 
democratically elected representatives.
45
 The democratic principle, however, has 
already been modified by the provisions of Article 115, para. 1 of the Basic Law. As 
long as the prerequisites of this norm are fulfilled, an infringement of the democratic 
principle cannot be found.  
 
Nevertheless, the Federal Constitutional Court has tried to derive legal limits for 
government debt from the principle of democratic rule. In the Court's opinion, it is a 
fundamental principle of the constitution that the “government may use credit only 
up to an amount equal to investment expenditures”.
46
 The problem of a perpetually 
 
42
  Wendt, id., who was, however, the legal representative of the state legislature which also took 
part in the law suit like the state government of the state of North-Rhine-Westphalia; crit. to the 
opinion of the court also Gumboldt, supra note 13, p. 502. 
43
  BVerfGE 79, 311, 341 f.; consenting: Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 10; Heintzen, 
supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-no. 15; Höfling/Rixen, supra note 12, margin-no. 325, who 
demand an explicit normative link to be able to apply the general proportionality principle 
outside the civil rights context. 
44
  For a view favoring such a principle, see especially Birk, Dieter, Die finanzverfassungsrecht-
lichen Vorgaben für die Begrenzung der Staatsverschuldung, DVBl. 1984, p. 745, 748. 
45
  Püttner, Günter, Staatsverschuldung, 1980, p. 12; crit. Siekmann, Helmut, Buchbesprechung, 
FinArch n.F., vol. 41 (1983), p. 167, 169. 
46  BVerfGE 79, 311, 334, 343; 99, 57, 67, with the result that borrowing funds which exeed the 
investment expenditures constitute a “serious drawback” in the sense of § 32 BVerfGG.   
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increasing pedestal of public debt can however no more be solved in this way than it 
can by the (questionable) use of Article 109, para. 2 of the Basic Law, because the 
statement of the Court relates only to consumptive government spending.  
 
Aside from that, many decisions of the current government and Parliament – outside 
of government finances – have had grave effects on future generations and their 
freedom of action, yet no one has argued such decisions inappropriately curtail 
democratic rights. 
 
6. Creating Transparency  
According to Article 114, para. 1 of the Basic Law, the minister of finance is obliged 
at the end of each fiscal year to render an accounting not only of all proceeds and 
expenditures, but also of assets and debts. Such an accounting, if comprehensive and 
true, would make it possible to achieve transparency with respect to the future 
burden.
47
  
 
Constitutional law does not provide further details regarding this accounting. Thus, a 
widely accepted interpretation of Article 114, para. 1 of the Basic Law reaches the 
conclusion that the norm does not have the purpose of producing a balance sheet that 
discloses the overall net-wealth of the Federation.
48
 On the basis of this 
interpretation, numerous circumventions of the legal obligation are possible and in 
fact carried out, especially in respect of “extra budgets”
49
 and (quasi) public 
enterprises, where sizeable sums of tax revenues seep away, and where dynamite for 
future budgets is sometimes buried.  
 
 
47
  The Bundesbank has made an attempt to produce it. The result is a negative (!) net wealth in 
2004 compared with a positve net wealth of 30% of the GDB in 1991 and of 60% in 1991, cp. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 31. 
48
  Heintzen, supra note 13, Art. 114 margin-no. 12. 
49
 See  Schwarz, Kyrill A., in: v. Mangoldt/Klein/Starck (ed.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 5th ed. 
2005, Art. 114 margin-no. 29-32.  
  14
Hence severe difficulties arise when trying to take “explicit” public debt into 
account. It might be possible to solve these difficulties with an adequate 
interpretation of Article 114, para. 1 of the Basic Law. The attempt to enclose the 
“implicit” public debt in such an account would, however, be doomed to failure. No 
category for “reserves for uncertain or undefined obligation” is provided, but such a 
category would be necessary to take into account the “implicit” public debt.  
 
7. Interim Result 
This brief overview of the constitutional provisions that are relevant for government 
borrowing shows already that the existing provisions are hardly suited to limit the 
public debt to an amount that is sustainable in the long run. Vague starting points for 
confining the “implicit” public debt could be found in the democratic principle, 
which would, however, require a substantially different interpretation. The right 
place to enhance transparency, which would be very beneficial, would be the 
accounting rules in Article 114, para. 1 of the Basic Law. Again, a much stricter 
interpretation and practice is needed as a first step. Further legal research in this field 
is in any case desirable. 
 
III. Further Normative Enhancements  
1. The Interdiction of Government Borrowing  
The introduction of a constitutional obligation to preserve financial equilibrium in 
normal economic situations (Normallage) – as now proposed by the Federal Minister 
of Finance 
50
– could mitigate the problem of the “implicit” public debt, but it would 
not fulfil the already existing need for consolidation. Moreover, its effectiveness in 
practice is questionable. The experiences of past years have shown that governments 
often are unwilling to strictly obey the requirements placed on extra borrowing to 
avert a disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium. In particular – and above 
 
50
  Der Spiegel, 26/2006, p. 48.  
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all – they have never realized a net reduction of government debt in time of boom,
51
 
which is crucial in the logic of this exception to borrowing limits. A correct 
application of the rules would absolutely require that the extra debt incurred to fight 
disequilibria add up to zero during the course of a full business cycle.
52
 In addition, a 
disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium is much too easily assumed, even if 
there is no factual basis for it, in order to create new slack for additional 
borrowings.
53
 
 
On the other hand, the introduction of a full-fledged interdiction of all government 
borrowing, i.e. without exemption clauses that would allow borrowing under certain 
circumstances, could result in severe economic disadvantages. Substantial variations 
of income-tax rates might be inevitable to balance the budget. This, in turn, could 
aggravate instabilities. Such variations would thus probably have to be prohibited as 
well.
54
 
 
These new rules might mitigate the problems of the “explicit” public debt but –
 again – would not automatically solve the problem of the “implicit” debt. Additional 
provisions would be needed. 
 
51
  For more on this requirement, see Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 12, 51; in the 
same sense now also Gröpl, supra note 13, p. 238. 
52
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 51; agreeing: Wendt, supra note 17, margin-no. 31; 
Wendt/Elicker, supra note 40, p. 500; Gumboldt, supra note 13, p. 500; see also Deutsche 
Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 27, which erroneously supposes that such a legal obligaton does not 
yet exist (for the extra borrowing). 
53
  For example in 2005. As early as fall of 2003 the Council of Economic Advisers could not see 
any imminent disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium that could justify additional 
borrowing (Sachverständigenrat, supra note 7, p. 328).  
54
  Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie and Uribe, Martin, Balanced-Budget Rules, Distortionary Taxes, and 
Aggregate Instability, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 5 (1997), p. 976, 978, 998, supposing a 
Laffer curve-type relationship between tax rate and tax revenue in the steady state (p. 980, 984). 
See also Corsetti/Roubini, supra note 2, p. 409: “Both neoclassical (tax-smoothing) and 
Keynesian models of fiscal deficits advocate the optimality of deficit spending during 
recessions.” But experience shows that the necessary (complementary) surplus saving in the 
boom has not worked in Germany.  
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2. Enhancement of Transparency  
As already mentioned, it would be possible to enhance transparency,
55
 but this would 
likely be a less effective way to mitigate the problem. Article 114, para. 1 of the 
Basic Law would have to be amended to create a strict obligation for a 
comprehensive accounting. It would have to cover all assets and debts, including the 
“implicit” public debt and all extra budgets, regardless of whether they belong to 
legally separate entities.  
 
Additionally, one might consider strengthening the individual rights of the members 
of the Parliaments to demand comprehensive information during the budgetary 
process. The constitutional courts have already acknowledged these rights 
judicially,
56
 but they need to be enlarged and specified.
57
 This is especially desirable 
with regard to extra-budgets, public enterprises and the recipients of subsidies that 
absorb a sizeable portion of tax revenues. It has to be expressly provided that, in the 
course of the budgetary process when the legislature has to apportion vast sums of 
money, it will no longer be possible to invoke „business secrets “
58
 or the „personal 
rights“ of the potential beneficiaries of government monies to avoid a full disclosure 
of the relevant facts upon request. In this way, during the deliberation in connection 
with enacting the budget, the risks for future budgets could be assessed more 
properly in advance. 
 
 
55
  The importance of an enhanced transparency is particularly underlined by Deutsche Bundesbank, 
supra note 4, p. 37. 
56
  BVerfGE 70, 324, 355, 359; 79, 311, 344; 110, 199, 221 es seq. (as constitutional court for the 
state of Schleswig-Holstein); VerfGH NW, judgement of 4 October 1993, NWVBl. 1994, p. 10, 
11; VerfGH Rheinl.-Pfalz, judgement of 20 November 1996, DÖV 1997, p. 246: expressively 
requiring transparency of the development of public finances and a corresponding obligation of 
the parliament to seek disclosure of the facts. 
57
  Corsetti/Roubini, supra note 2, p. 412 emphasize the importance of procedural budget rules and 
consider the reform of institutions and procedural rules as a provision of “effective fiscal 
discipline at lower macroeconomic costs”. 
58
  Very popular among the biggest receivers of government subsidies like RAG. There, substantive 
“impicit” public debt might also be hidden (“eternity burdens” of coal mining - Ewigkeitslasten).  
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3. Authorizations for future budget 
The instrument of authorizing the government to create obligations for future 
expenditures (Verpflichtungserächtigung) is not expressly regulated in German 
constitutional law.
59
 It is derived from the budget autonomy of the parliaments.
60
 
Because most parts of the “implicit” public debt are based on statutary regulation a 
stricter application of the described instrument would also not render useful results 
for “prospective” entitlements. 
 
IV. Interim Result 
Provisions of German constitutional law on government borrowing are clearly 
insufficient to properly regulate the fiscal burden of an ageing society, as reflected in 
the “implicit” public debt. A starting point for enhancement could be a clearer 
application of the democratic principle specifically to the budgetary process and an 
articulated obligation for comprehensive accounting. This could be achieved by a 
stricter interpretation of Article 114, para. 1 of the Basic Law or by an amendment of 
this norm. The same would be true for the parallel provisions in the state 
constitutions. 
 
 
C. THE REQUIREMENTS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
The orientation of European Union Law is not as clearly focused on short term 
financing for budgetary needs as is German law on public debt. The EU law focuses 
more strongly on the fact that financial burdens from budgetary decisions, especially 
from the raising of funds by borrowing, must be bearable in the future. Because of 
the difficulty of creating a workable definition for a balanced budget after 
eliminating cyclical distortions (konjunkturbereinigt ausgeglichener Haushalt), the 
 
59
  Gröpl, supra note 13, p. 232. 
60
  VerfGH Rheinl.-Pfalz, judgement of 20 November 1996, DÖV 1997, p. 246, 248 es seq.; 
Siekmann, Helmut, Abhandlungen zum öffentlichen Finanzrecht, vol. 1 (2005), p. 45.  
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European regulators attempted to keep at least the national debt to gross national 
product ratio constant over time by introducing the “Maastricht criteria”.
61
  
 
The European Community Treaty (EC Treaty) requires the “sustainability” of the 
fiscal policy and offers by this at least a rudimentary guideline for a long term 
budget-policy. Article 121, para. 1, of the EC Treaty, declares “the sustainability of 
the government financial position” to be the essential criterion for sustainable 
convergence in the framework of the economic and monetary union. Even if 
Article 121 of the EC Treaty belongs to the transitional provisions, the requirements 
of Article 104 of the EC Treaty dealing with the avoidance of an “excessive 
government deficit” and “budgetary discipline”, as well as the relevant implementing 
regulations in the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact
62
 essentially reinforce 
this central theme.
63
  
 
I. The regulations 
1. Content 
Article 104, para. 1 of the EC Treaty simply states: “Member States shall avoid 
excessive government deficit”. The term “excessive” is not defined as such in the 
 
61
  Zeitler, supra note 10, p. 11.  
62
  The Pact is not a contract in a legal sense. The term “Pact”, which is also used in legal acts of the 
European Community, was coined to stress the underlying political consensus. Technically it 
consists of one resolution of the European Council, which is not compulsive, and two –
 binding – regulations of the Council:  
(1)  Resolution of the European Council on the Stability und Growth Pact of 17 July 1997, 
Official Journal C 236, 2/8/1997, p. 1 
(2)  Council Regulation (EC) no. 466/97 of 7 July 1997 on strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Official 
Journal L 209, 2/8/1997, p. 1; amended by the Council Regulation (EC) no. 1055/2005 of 27 
June 2005, Official Journal L 174, 7/7/2005, p. 1 
(3)  Council Regulation (EC) no. 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, Official Journal L 209, 2/8/1997, p. 6; 
amended by the Council Regulation (EC) no. 1056/97 of 27 June 2005, Official Journal 
L 174, 7/7/2005, p. 5. 
63
  Häde, Ulrich, in: Callies/Ruffert (ed.), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag, 2nd ed. 
2002, Art. 104 margin-no. 6 es seq.  
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Treaty. Whether a deficit is “excessive”, shall only be evaluated on the basis of the 
following two criteria:  
1.  the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic 
product, and 
2.  the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product. 
This regulation stated in Article 104, para. 2, clause 3 of the EC Treaty, is made 
manageable by establishing numerically fixed reference values. They are specified in 
the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the EC Treaty,
64
 and 
therefore belong to primary community law.
65
 The regulation reads as follows:  
“The reference values referred to in Article 104c para. 2 of this Treaty are:  
-  3% for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic 
product at market prices, and 
-  60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices.” 
 
The values are not arbitrarily fixed, although that is occasionally maintained.
66
 They 
are linked with one another by the fact that with an assumed nominal growth rate of 
5% per year for the gross domestic product, the growth rate of government debt may 
be up to 3% per year without pushing the government debt to gross domestic 
product-ratio above 60%.
67
 Moreover, the historical average of public investment 
expenditure in the European Community had been about 3 percent of GDP at their 
introduction. Thus borrowing had been allowed within the limits of capital 
expenditures.
68
 
 
The legal meaning of these values is debatable. They could be considered as a fixed 
ceiling.
69
 Surpassing one of the reference values would imply the existence of an 
 
64  BGBl. II 1992, p. 1309 (5. Protokoll). Persuant to Art. 311 EC-Treaty it is part of the Treaty. 
65
  Kempen, Bernhard, in: Streinz (ed.), EUV/EGV, 2003, Art. 104 margin-no. 7. 
66
 See  Corsetti/Roubini, supra note 2, p. 408; Zeitler, supra note 10, p. 11. 
67
  3:5 = 0.6. 
68
 See  Corsetti/Roubini, supra note 2, p. 409 stating: “The Maastricht deficit criterion can then be 
interpreted as an implicit current account balanced-budget rule”. They give an overall positiv 
evaluation of the European rules. 
69
  Corsetti/Roubini, supra note 2, p. 409; Hartmann, supra note 84, p. 69 es seq.  
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“excessive government debt”. But they could also be interpreted somewhat more 
flexibly as the majority of scholars does.
70
  
 
Nevertheless, in essence an obligation for Germany to have a “structurally” almost 
balanced budget could be derived from the EU law.
71
 
 
2. Effect on Domestic Law 
The limitations that the EU law imposes on the borrowing of funds by the member 
states are directly applicable in the member states. They are legally binding without 
implementation or transformation into national law and, since the beginning of the 
third stage of the economic and monetary union on 1 January 1999, have to be 
obeyed without any reservation, Article 116, para. 3 of the EC Treaty.
72
 EU law 
enjoys priority over all national law
73
 –, including constitutional law
74
. However, if 
 
70
  Saint-Étienne, Christian, Finances publiques européennes : une réforme politiquement 
acceptable du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, in: Conseil d’Analyse économique (ed.), 
Réformer le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, 2004, p. 49, 51 : “On peut contester que” “la 
décision par le Conseil des ministres des 24 et 25 novembre 2003 de rejeter les sanctions (…) à 
l’encontre de la France et de l’Allemagne” “respecte l’esprit de la résolution du 17 Juin 1997, 
mais les textes ont été respectés”; Häde, supra note 63, margin-no. 13; Kempen, supra note 65, 
margin-no. 15.  
71
  Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 31. 
72
  Kempen, supra note 65, margin-no. 4. 
73
  ECJ, collection of decisions 1964, p. 1251, 1257, 1269 es seq.; 1970, 1125 margin-no. 3; 1978, 
629 margin-no. 17 f.; 1981, 1805 margin-no. 43 for executive orders; BVerfGE 73, 339, 375; 75, 
223, 244; 85, 191, 202; Tomuschat, Christian, in: Bonner Kommentar, Art. 24 (lose leaf: 1985), 
margin-no. 79, 81 at the end; Ipsen, Hans Peter, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (ed.), Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, vol. VII, 1992, § 181 margin-no. 59; Blanke, Hermann-Josef, Föderalismus und 
Integrationsgewalt, 1992, p. 290; Oppermann, Thomas, Europarecht, 2nd ed. 1999, margin-no.  
615 es seq.; Jarass, Hans D., Grundfragen der innerstaatlichen Bedeutung des EG-Rechts, 1994, 
p. 2 es seq.; Jarass, Hans D./Beljin, Saša, Die Bedeutung von Vorrang und Durchführung des 
EG-Rechts für die nationale Rechtsetzung und Rechtsanwendung, NVwZ 2004, p. 1; Wegener, 
Bernhard, in: Callies/Ruffert (ed.), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag, 2nd ed. 2002, 
Art. 220 margin-no. 22; Streinz, Rudolf, in: Streinz (ed.), EUV/EGV, 2003, Art. 1 EGV margin-
no. 19; Schroeder, Werner, in: Streinz (ed.), EUV/EGV, 2003, Art. 249 EGV margin-no. 40 es 
seq.; Geiger, Rudolf, Grundgesetz und Völkerrecht, 3rd ed. 2002, p. 246 es seq. 
74
  ECJ, collection of decisions 1970, p. 1125 margin-no. 3; Streinz, supra note 73; Schroeder, supra 
note 73, margin-no. 44; Jarass/Beljin, supra note 73, p. 2; Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 109 
margin-no. 54.  
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domestic law violates a provision of the EU law, the domestic regulation is not 
automatically void. Rather it is only inapplicable.
75
  
 
In effect, the rules of the German constitutional law on the borrowing of funds are 
superceded but not displaced by the EU law. They can have a parallel existence, 
since they do not collide with each other in (a) their application and (b) their legal 
consequences:
76
  
(1) The requirements of the European Union Law refer to the entire public sector of 
the member states. This means that they cannot create direct obligations for the 
various parts of the Federal Republic. The EU regulations do not plainly provide a 
numerically defined or definable upper limit for the government debt of any part of 
the federally organized state.
77
  
(2) The legal consequences of offences are also different. Differently from German 
national law, a breach of EU law does not lead to the offending budgetary law 
becoming void or non-applicable.
78
 Rather the special deficit-limiting regulations of 
the EU law provide a complex system of mechanisms to discipline the offending 
member state under Art. 104, para. 2 - 8, 10, 11 - 13 of the EC Treaty. In the case of 
persistent offenses, the Council of the European Union can impose one or several of 
the sanctions enumarated in Article 104, para. 11, clause 1 of the EC Treaty.
79
 This 
 
75
  Somewhat disputed, but majority opinion: Wegener, supra note 73, margin-no. 23; Streinz, supra 
note 73, margin-no. 20; Schroeder, supra note 73, margin-no. 43; with additional differentiations 
Jarass/Beljin, supra note 73, p. 4 es seq.; Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 109 margin-no. 54; in 
effect consenting but with varying argumentation BVerfGE 22, 293, 295 es seq.; 89, 155, 190. 
76
  Gröpl, supra note 13, p. 227. This could be considered as priority in a wider sense, proposed by 
Jarass/Beljin, supra note 73, p. 3. 
77
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 17; agreeing Heun, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-
no. 5; Gröpl, supra note 13, p. 227; Gumboldt, supra note 13, p. 505 f. Specifically, they do not 
contain numerically fixed provisions for the acceptable deficit of the federal government. 
Subseqently Article 104 EC Treaty cannot be considered as an implicit amendment of Art. 115 
Basic Law; for this, however, Häde, supra note 63, margin-no. 72. 
78
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 18; consent. Heun, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-
no. 5. 
79  For more details, see Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 
Gutachten zur Bedeutung der Maastricht-Kriterien für die Verschuldungsgrenzen von Bund und 
Ländern (Opinion on the Meaning of the Maastricht Criteria for limits on indebtedness for the 
Federation and the Federal States), Schriftenreihe Heft 54, 1994.  
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system of legal sanctions has priority over any general rules as “lex specialis”.
80
 For 
this reason, in the (highly improbable) case that a violation of one of the EU critera 
can be attributed to specific budgetary decisions of one or more parts of the 
Federation, the sanction by itself does not render it void or inapplicable. 
 
3. Application to the States of the Federation 
The addressee of the stability requirements of EU law is the Federation (Bund). 
According to Article 3, clause 1 of the Protocol on Excessive Deficits, the Federation 
is even responsible for those parts of the national deficit
81
 that are caused by the other 
parts of the federal state.  
 
According to Article 109, para. 1 of the Basic Law the Federation and the states have 
sovereignty over their own budgetary matters. Their budgets are separate and 
independent. For this reason it would have been necessary to amend Article 109 of 
the Basic Law after signing the treaty of Maastricht. Only this way the Federation 
(Bund) could be attributed the necessary authority to fulfill its obligations under EU 
law.
82
 The introduction of such an amendment failed and that is the reason why the 
federal government later pronounced that it was not necessary. Years later, 
Section 51a was instead inserted into the Basic Budgetary Law (Haushaltsgrund-
sätzegesetz). This clause is, however, insufficient in many ways
83
 and is altogether 
unconstitutional as the Federation, as of this writing, lacks the competence for such 
 
80
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 115 margin-no. 18; consent. Heun, supra note 13, Art. 115 margin-
no. 5. 
81
  Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 109 margin-no. 51. 
82
  Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen, supra note 79, p. 48; Stern, 
Klaus, Die Konvergenzkriterien des Vertrags von Maastricht und ihre Umsetzung in der 
bundesstaatlichen Finanzverfassung, in: Festschrift Everling, vol. I, 1995, p. 1469, 1488; 
Höfling, Wolfram, Haushaltsdisziplinierung der Länder durch Bundesrecht, ZRP 1997, p. 231, 
233 es seq.; Vogel, Klaus/Waldhoff, Christian, in: Bonner Kommentar, vor Art. 104 a margin-
no. 661; Siekmann, supra note 6, Art. 109 margin-no. 54 with extensive references; Hillgruber, 
supra note 13, Art. 109 margin-no. 148, Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 35; see also 
Gumboldt, supra note 13, p. 504; disagreeing Heun, supra note 13, Art. 109 margin-no. 7. 
83
  Kirchhof, supra note 13, p. 1773; Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 33: “fruitless” 
(weitgehend wirkungslos).  
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legislation.
84
 The recently adopted “Maßstäbegesetz”
85
 can also not create a binding 
obligation for the states of the Federation. Its section 4, para. 3 is a futile attempt of 
regulation.  
 
In addition, the problem of how the burdens of sanctions resulting from violation of 
EU law are to be distributed within the confederate framework remains unresolved. 
The regulation of Article 104a, para. 5 (old) of the Basic Law is clearly unsuitable 
for a solution of this issue, since the clause only aims at administrative actions and 
the borrowing of funds has to be authorized by law. 
 
But the situation is changing rapidly.
86
 The move to amend the Basic Law, which 
was originally stalled and then deemed unnecessary, has come to fruition in the mean 
time. Already the first stage of the “Federalism Reform” (Föderalismusreform) seeks 
to solve this hitherto unresolved problem.
87
 It was adopted by the parliament 
(Bundestag) on 30 June 2006
88
 with the Bundesrat consenting a few days later.
89
 The 
newly inserted paragraph 5 of Article 109 of the Basic Law, declares the fulfilment 
of obligations arising under legal acts of the European Community adopted 
according to Article 104 of the EC Treaty a common task of the Federation and the 
states (Länder). They have to be borne in the ratio of 65 to 35 by the Federation and 
the entirety of the states. Furthermore, according to the new Article 104a, para. 6, 
clause 2 of the Basic Law, burdens arising from financial adjustments demanded by 
 
84
  Art. 109, para. 3 Basic Law does not offer sufficient legislative competence; see Hillgruber, 
supra note 13, Art. 109 margin-no. 144; Mehde, Volker, Gesetzgebungskompetenz des Bundes 
zur Aufteilung der Verschuldungsgrenzen des Vertrags von Maastricht, DÖV 1997, p. 616, 619; 
disagreeing: Hartmann, Uwe, Europäische Union und die Budgetautonomie der deutschen 
Länder, 1994, p. 178 es seq.; Heun, supra note 13, Art. 109 margin-no. 7. Art. 109, para. 4 Basic 
Law adresses exclusively the competences of the Federation to limit credit financing by the other 
parts of the Federal Republic and is not fulfilled in the present context, see Heintzen, supra 
note 13, Art. 109 margin-no. 27. 
85
  From 9 September 2001, BGBl. I, p. 3202. 
86
  This change had urgently been asked for by Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 35. 
87
  See Draft of Amendments to the Basic Law (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des 
Grundgesetzes), 7 March 2006, BT-Drucks. 16/813. 
88
 44
th session of the 16
th term, 30 June 2006, documented first in print by BR-Drucks. 462/06. 
89
 824
th session, 7 July 2006, BR-Drucks. 462/06 (Beschluss).  
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the European Union that have effects beyond the borders of a single state are to be 
borne in the ratio of 15 to 85 by the Federation and the entirety of the states. In both 
cases the allocation to individual states is under the reservation of more detailed 
regulation by federal law with consent of the Bundesrat. 
 
II. Addressing “Implicit” Public Debt  
In their basic structure, the requirements of EU law are suited to address the problem 
of “implicit” public debt because of their alignment towards the “sustainability” of 
the government financial position. In contrast to the financial provisions of German 
constitutional law, the EU regulations are clearly aligned on a medium- and long- 
term basis. They aim at the maintenance of a bearable government debt in the long 
term.
90
 Since they – in contrast to German law – consider not only intended values, 
but also the actual raising of credit in the budget execution, they already have an 
impact on periods subsequent to the passing of the budget.  
 
Crucial for the inclusion of the overall “implicit” public debt is the definition of the 
term “deficit”. It is defined in Article 2 of the Protocol as “net borrowing as defined 
in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts”. The European system of 
Economic Accounts (ESA) in its present form originated in 1995 and has been 
amended by various EC regulations of the Council
91
 and the Commission since 
 
90
  This is also the reason why there have been proposals to treat public investments and the 
accounting of capital-movements in a different way by the Pact, cp. Blanchard, Olivier and 
Giavezzi, Francesco, Comment améliorer le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance par une 
comptabilité appropriée de l’investissement public, in : Conseil d’Analyse économique (ed.), 
Réformer le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, 2004, p. 15, 21. 
91
  Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 of 25 June 1996 on the European system of national and 
regional accounts in the Community, Official Journal L 310, 30/11/1996, p. 1-469; subsequently 
amended by: Council Regulation (EC) No 448/98 of 16 February 1998 completing and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 with respect to the allocation of financial intermediation services 
indirectly measured (FISIM) within the European system of national and regional accounts 
(ESA), Official Journal L 058, 27/02/1998, p. 1-14; Regulation (EC) No 2516/2000 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 November 2000 modifying the common principles 
of the European system of national and regional accounts in the Community (ESA) 95 as 
concerns taxes and social contributions and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96, 
Official Journal L 290, 17/11/2000, p. 1-2; Regulation (EC) No 2558/2001 of the European  
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then.
92
 
 
By the definition persuant to these rules, promises to perform that are given under 
conditions, such as prospective entitlements to pensions, are excluded. Although 
social security systems belong to the sector “state”
93
, prospective entitlements to 
pensions are as a rule only “contingent liabilities” for the debitor and only 
“contingent assets” for the creditor. They are only accounted for by the ESA if the 
contractual agreement on which they are based „itself has a market value because it 
is tradable or can be offset on the market”.
94
 Prospective entitlements to pensions in 
Germany's social security system or in the separate system for public employees 
(Pensionen der Beamten)
95
 do not satisfy these conditions; therefore, they are not 
 
Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2223/96 as regards the reclassification of settlements under swaps arrangements and under 
forward rate agreements, Official Journal L 344, 28/12/2001, p. 1-4; Regulation (EC) 
No 359/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2002 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 as concerns the use of ESA 95 in the determination of 
Member States’ payments to the VAT-based own resource, Official Journal L 58, 28/02/2002, 
p. 1-2;. Regulation (EC) No 1267/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
June 2003 with respect to the time limit for transmission of the main aggregates of national 
accounts and to the transmission of employment data in hours worked, Official Journal L 180, 
28/07/2003, p. 1-22. 
92
  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1500/2000 of 10 July 2000 implementing Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2223/96 with respect to general government expenditure and revenue, Official Journal 
L 172, 12/07/2000, p. 3-10; Commission Regulation (EC) No 995/2001 of 22 May 2001 
implementing Regulation (EC) No 2516/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
modifying the common principles of the European system of national and regional accounts in 
the Community (ESA 95) as concerns taxes and social contributions, Official Journal L 139, 
23/05/2001, p. 3-8; Commission Regulation (EC) No 113/2002 of 23 January 2002 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 with regard to revised classifications of expenditure 
according to purpose, Official Journal L 021, 24/01/2002, p. 3-9. 
93
  As S.1314, cited from the consolidated text, document ID: 1996R2223 from 07/08/2003, p. 41; 
see also the official edition by eurostat, Europäisches System Volkswirtschaftlicher 
Gesamtrechnungen – ESVG 1995, 1996, p. 31. 
94
  ESA, supra note 93, p. 126 (5.05.). This made even clearer by the additional remark, id.: 
“Otherwise, a contingent asset is not recorded in the system. (1) Insurance technical reserves 
(AF.6) are unconditional liabilities of insurance corporations and pension funds. However, the 
counterpart financial assets of individual policy holders and beneficiaries are contingent assests 
in most cases.” In a “pay-as-you-go” pension system are essentially no technical reserves and the 
assets of the beneficiaries are only contingent. Only „prepayments of insurance premiums and 
reserves for outstanding claims (F.62)” and “net equity of households in pension funds reserves 
(F.612)” are shown in funds’ liabilities and household assets, supra note 93, p. 351. 
95
  The ESA classifies “insurance schemes organized by government units for their own employees” 
not “as social security schemes, but as private funded or unfunded social insurance schemes”  
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included within the financing account of the state.
96
 As a result they do not contribute 
to the financing balance or of the state in the national accounting system.
97
  
 
The Deficit Protocol defines the term “debt” as the “total gross debt at nominal value 
outstanding at the end of the year after consolidation and consolidated between and 
within the sectors of general government”.
98
 Since prospective entitlements are not 
entered in the financing account of the state, they are at present not treated as a part 
of the public debt.  
 
III. Expansion to Include the “Implicit” Public Debt 
1. The Necessity of Amending the Primary Law  
In order to include the “implicit” public debt within the requirements of EU law, the 
definition of the term “deficit” has to be expanded. It may be sufficient to change the 
assignments in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA),
99
 on 
which the Deficit Protocol is based. In light of the serious consequences for the 
entire deficit procedure, it can not be assumed that a dynamic reference was 
intended. Primary EU law would have to be amended.  
 
(supra note 93, p. 348). In Germany they would be basically unfunded social insurance schemes. 
However, some units have begun to form reserves for that purpose. 
96
  ESA, supra note 93, p. 126 (5.05.). Government expenditure and revenue have later been 
specified more detailed in the annex of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1500/2000, supra 
note 92. It is table 2 in annex B of the system. 
97
  ESA, supra note 93, p. 211 (8.50.). 
98
  For the purpose of the Member States' reports to the Commission under the excessive deficit 
procedure laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 (Official Journal L 332, 
31/12/1993, p. 7. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 475/2000, Official Journal 
L 58, 3/3/2000, p. 1), “Government deficit” is the balancing item “net borrowing/net lending” of 
General Government, including streams of interest payments resulting from swaps arrangements 
and forward rate agreements. “This balancing item is codified as EDPB9. For this purpose, 
interest includes the above mentioned flows and is codified as EDPD41”, Regulation (EC) 
No 2558/2001, supra note 91. The definition of the term “deficit” does not follow a well defined 
economic concept and could be considered as rather an “arbitrary numer whose value depends 
on how the government chooses to label its receipts and payments”, cp. Auerbach/Gokhale 
/Kothlikoff supra note 3, p. 74. 
99
  Expansion of the present accounting system towards a „socio-economic“ general accounting 
systen by Schwarz, Norbert, Der Beitrag der Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung zur 
sozioökonomischen Modellierung, Statistisches Bundesamt (manuscript 2006), p. 5 es seq.  
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2. The Compliance with the Deficit Criteria 
Within the territory of the states participating in the common European currency, the 
euro area, the financing balance has been negative since 1970. Only in three periods 
was a balance almost reached. That was in the years 1970, 1973 and 2001. In this 
regard, the disciplining effect on the public finances by the Maastricht criteria as a 
condition for a country's participation in the common currency is clearly visible. 
However the effect rapidly lost momentum.
100
 In every year since 2002, Germany 
failed to fulfill the criteria of the Deficit Protocol.
101
 France, Italy and some other 
member states have an almost as negative record.
102
 
 
An initial, superficial analysis of the causal nexus indicates that the emergence of the 
chronic deficits coincides in time with a significant increase in public expenditures at 
the beginning of the seventies, continuing into the middle of the eighties of the last 
century. The re-appearance of the financing imbalances after 2000 fall in a period 
marked by considerable tax reductions that are not accompanied by corresponding 
reductions in expenditures.
103
 
 
When evaluating these figures, it must be remembered, however, that they are 
averages for the entire euro area. They consist of a remarkably heterogeneous set of 
individual values. Above all, the group of the “reform countries” stands out. They 
launched extensive programs to cut and reform public expenditures, and reduced 
their primary expenditures by more than 5% of their gross domestic products as 
measured against their respective, historical maximum expenditures. The “first 
wave” of “reform countries” consisted of the four states: Belgium, Ireland, 
 
100
 See  Artus, Patrick, Les mauvaises règles de politique macroéconomique sont-elles responsables 
de la faible croissance de la zone euro ?, in : Conseil d’Analyse économique (ed.), Réformer le 
Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, 2004, p. 27, 30.  
101
  Deficit ratio to GDP: -3.7% (2002), -4.0 (2003), -3.7 (2004), -3.3 (2005); debt ratio to GDP: 60.3 
(2002), 63.8 (2003), 65.5 (2004), 67.7 (2005). The Bundesbank remanded it as the “lacking 
political will” to transform strictly the existing rules, Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 31. 
102
  For details see the news release of eurostat 48/2006 of 24 April 2006, and European Central 
Bank, ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2006, S50 and S51; see also Artus, supra note 100, p. 30, 34. 
103
  European Central Bank, Die Bedeutung von Reformen der Staatsausgaben für 
Wirtschaftswachstum und Stabilität, ECB Monthly Bulletin, April 2006, p. 67, 69.  
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Luxembourg and The Netherlands. In a “second wave”, Spain, Austria and Finland 
followed. In contrast, the remaining five countries of the euro area made no or very 
little progress. These are the principal findings of the ECB.
104
 
 
The reform countries were able not only to reduce the volume of their total 
expenditures, but also to improve the composition of their expenditures. Productive 
expenditures, such as for investments and education, were reduced relatively less 
than expenditures for state consumption. This way the portion of total expenditures 
made for those purposes increased. In addition, it became possible to enact tax 
reductions that were fully covered be other financial means. In effect they did not 
have to be financed by (additional) borrowing. The states that embedded their 
spending reductions within extensive structural reforms could thus clearly improve 
almost all of their macro-economic indicators and set themselves apart not only from 
the average rates of development in the euro area, but also from the other euro area 
states, i.e., Germany, France and Italy.
105
 
 
Both the ECB and a considerable part of the economic literature thus see expenditure 
reductions as an extremely effective means of guarantying durable budget 
consolidation.
106
 In reality, however, a remarkable discrepancy existed between the 
plans of the states of the euro area for recovering budget stability, as announced in 
their annually updated stability programs, and the existing facts. At least the plan to 
reduce the portion of public expenditures of the gross domestic product was largely a 
failure.
107
 
 
3. The Lacking Rigidity of the Deficit Criteria 
The fiscal reference values of the EU Law are not judged as a rigid ceiling. Various 
additional circumstances have to be taken into account when deciding whether 
 
104
  European Central Bank, supra note 103, p. 74 es seq. 
105
  European Central Bank, supra note 103, p. 76. 
106
  European Central Bank, supra note 103, p. 76; Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 35. 
107
  European Commission, Autumn Forecast 2005, European Central Bank, supra note 103, p. 80.  
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deficits are “excessive”.
108
 But even if an “excessive” deficit can be ascertained the 
procedures to impose sanctions are complicated and painstaking. The inherent 
weakness of the sanction mechanisms was rendered even weaker by the amendments 
of the stability pact in 2005.
109
 This makes it even more doubtful that the expansion 
of the deficit definition alone would achieve the desired results. 
 
4. Interim Result 
Before changing the primary law to include the “implicit” public debt, assurances 
would therefore first have to be provided that the rules could also be enforced in the 
large member states like France, Germany and Italy, which had so far undertaken 
some reform steps, but were still a long way from the goal of a long-term, 
sustainable state of the public finances.  
 
IV. Interim Result 
A question that is even more serious than the obedience to German constitutional law 
on finance is that of enforcing the requirements of EU law – if not its words, at least 
its spirit – against the governments of influential member states. This problem must 
be addressed before the scope of application of the existing rules is to be expanded. 
 
 
108
  See above at p. 19. 
109
  For sources see footnote 62; very critical of the changes Deutsche Bundesbank, Die Änderungen 
am Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt, Monthly Bulletin, April 2005, p. 15, 20: “considerable 
weakening, additional complication and intransparancy”, giving the details of the changes in 
procedure, even though the material substance derived from the EC Treaty remained unchanged; 
Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 32; for the discussion whether there is a need of 
amending the Pact from an economic point of view see the contributions in : Conseil d’Analyse 
économique (ed.), Réformer le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, 2004. At least the weak growth 
rates in the Euro-zone are not caused by the rules of the Pact, cp. Artus (supra note 100), id., 
p. 36; for the problem of taking into account “exceptional circumstances” see Bénassy-Quéré, 
Agnès and Penot, Alexis, Vers une redéfinition des « circonstances exceptionnelles » du Pacte de 
stabilité et de croissance, id., p. 93.  
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D. NATIONAL STABILITY PACT 
Because of the quite insufficient compliance of the Federal Republic with the EU-
requirements for government deficits
110
 and of the extensive borrowing of funds by 
the various parts of the federal state
111
 the establishment of a “National Stability 
Pact” has been discussed for some time.
112
 This way, the different levels of the 
federal state were to be coordinated in regard of their borrowing funds.
113
 The 
proposals of politicians and scholars suffered, however, from serious drawbacks. 
They either contain no real legal obligation
114
 and could be categorized as one of the 
usual declamations which are superflous from the perspective of the constitutional 
law
115
 or, in case they were to contain binding legal obligations, they are – due to the 
failure to amend Art. 109 of the Basic Law as it would have been appropriate –
116
 on 
their face unconstitutional. The distribution of competences and powers – including 
the competence to bear financial burdens – among the Federation and the states are 
strictly regulated by the Basic Law. This regulation is binding and cannot be altered 
at the discretion of politicians, even if they act unanimously. It is as well not open to 
contractual agreements between the Federation and a single state or the entirety of 
states.
117
 Even if these principles have often been neglected in the past, that is no 
justification for further breaches of the law. 
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  Supra note 101. 
111
  In 2004 only about 60% of the borrowing was done by the federal government and 40% by the 
states and their municipalities. The debt of der federal level would only account to a 40% ratio of 
the GDP and the debt of the states to a more than 25% share, Deutsche Bundesbank, supra 
note 4, p. 24, 25, with vast differences among the various states.  
112
  Compare the description Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 32 es seq. 
113
  Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 32. 
114
  This is true for the later inserted § 51a HGrG (see supra at note 83). It is also (incorrectly) 
sometimes called “National Stability Pact”; see Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 33. The 
distribution of the deficit-potential by the Finanzplanungsrat for the years of 2004 until 2006 is 
neither appropriate nor binding, see Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4, p. 36.  
115
  Typical: press release of the state government for Brandenburg from 14 May 2002: Nationaler 
Stabilitätspakt und Solidarpakt II zwingen zur Haushaltsdisziplin. 
116
  Supra at p. 22. 
117
  Vogel/Waldhoff, supra note 82, margin-no. 661 at the end; problematic therefore: Hillgruber, 
supra note 13, Art. 109 margin-no. 148: “Staatsvertrag”; Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 4,  
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As already mentioned, the first stage of the “federalism reform” (Föderalismus-
reform) is on track to amend Art. 109 of the Basic Law.
118
 But it has not entrenched a 
“National Stability Pact” as the official motives for the amendments erroneously 
state.
119
 The new paragraph five of Art. 109 of the Basic Law only provides that the 
requirements from EU law regarding government deficits establish an obligation 
both for the Federation and the states. This means, that the burdens of the EU 
requirements are passed on to the various parts of the Federal Republic by national 
constitutional law. This is under no aspect a pact and in substance it is not national. 
The requirements are those of the EU law as it does not contain a material substance 
of its own.
120
 This could, however, mean that the EU requirements will be – in 
effect – in the future also requirements of the national constitutional law. It remains, 
however, the need to have sufficient complementary rules and institutions on the 
national level.
121
 
 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
This initial – and necessarily provisional – attempt to place the „implicit“ public debt 
within a legal framework delivered mainly negative results. Only a few, concrete 
starting points in the financial provisions of German constitutional law and in the EU 
law could be found. Nevertheless the systematically correct locations for further 
 
p. 32: “Ein nationaler Stabilitätspakt stellt einen Eingriff in die Haushaltsautonomie von Bund 
und Ländern dar und erfordert eine rechtliche Regelung, die der Zustimmung beider staatlichen 
Ebenen bedarf.” Not the consent of the two federal levels is necessary but a formal amendment 
to the constitution. That is a difference.  
118
  Supra at p. 23. 
119
  BT-Drucks. 16/813, p. 10. The expression has also been used during the extensive committee-
hearings and was part of the official agenda for the joint session by the committee for legal 
affairs and the committee for internal affairs on 31 May 2006, protocol of the 18
th session, 
p. 1 (A), 5 (C), 9 (C), 10 (B), 11 (B), 21 (D), 37 (C), 111 (C), 123 (D), 139 (D), 147 (D), 160 
(C). 
120
 See  also  Korioth, supra note 119, p. 11, 148 (D) who stated that the provision does not follow a 
convincing underlying principle and that it does not deal with the problem of preventing a 
deficit. For the direct application this can be true but not for the indirectly adopted rules of the 
EU law. Additional research is necessary to clearify the other point whether a material national 
regulation is desirable.  
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  European Central Bank, supra note 103, p. 78.  
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inquiry could be shown. Particularly serious is the current nonchalance with which a 
number of governments override mandatory provisions of the financial law or have 
stretched them in questionable ways to meet their own needs.  
 
 